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Martin Ravallion ("Why Don't We See Poverty Convergence?" American Economic Review, 
102(1): 504-23; 2012) presents evidence against the existence of convergence in global 
poverty rates despite convergence in household mean income levels and the close linkage 
between income growth and poverty reduction. We show that this finding is driven by a 
specification that demands more than simple convergence in poverty headcount rates and 
assumes a growth elasticity of poverty reduction, which is well-known to accelerate with 
falling initial poverty levels. If we motivate the poverty convergence equation using an 
arguably superior growth semi-elasticity of poverty reduction, we find highly significant and 
robust evidence of convergence in absolute poverty headcount ratios and poverty gaps. 
Relatedly, we show that the results in Ravallion (2012) are driven by the special income 
growth and poverty dynamics in Central and Eastern European transition economies that 
started with low initial poverty rates and thus observed a high elasticity of poverty reduction. 
Once we control for their abnormal poverty dynamics, we again find robust evidence of 
global convergence in poverty, even in the original specification by Ravallion (2012). 
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 In a recent contribution, Martin Ravallion (2012) raised the question of why we do not see 
convergence in poverty rates across the developing world. The argument is that one would 
expect poverty headcount ratios to converge across countries since higher mean household 
income tends to lower poverty (“advantages of growth”) and mean household incomes tend to 
converge across countries (“advantages of backwardness”).1 
Using a sample of household income data that covers about 90 developing countries between 
1977 and 20072 and focusing on the conventional poverty headcount ratio at $2/day, 
Ravallion (2012) finds evidence that both of these individual channels are at work, but that we 
do not observe convergence in poverty headcount ratios across countries. The econometric 
specification used to assess poverty convergence is given by  
 ∆ln =  
∗ + 
∗ ln , + 
∗ ,   (1) 
where  is the (absolute) poverty rate of country i at time t and ∗  is a disturbance term.  
This somewhat puzzling finding is explained in Ravallion (2012) by the adverse direct effect 
of poverty on economic growth and by the fact that a high initial poverty rate makes it harder 
to reduce poverty through growth in mean household income. Countries with low poverty 
rates have thus seen faster mean income growth and a higher elasticity of poverty reduction to 
mean income growth, given by  in the specification 
 ∆ ln =   + ∆ ln  + ,     (2) 
where denotes mean consumption (income) and  is the corresponding disturbance term. 
The parameter  in equation (2) is usually referred to as the “growth elasticity of poverty 
reduction”. It is well-known from the seminal work of Bourguignon (2003) that this elasticity 
“is a decreasing function of the development level of a country,” i.e. it necessarily increases 
(in absolute terms) at lower initial levels of poverty under the assumption of log-normally 
distributed incomes and if income growth is distribution-neutral.3 This increase per se has 
nothing to do with economic effects of poverty on income growth and convergence, which 
might certainly be at work, but is a mere identity reflecting the shape of the log-normal 
distribution and the associated fact that low initial poverty levels ceteris paribus lead to a high 
percentage reduction of poverty rates for a given growth rate. 
An additional problem associated with the use of the poverty elasticity of growth is its high 
sensitivity to low poverty incidence, when percentage changes are particularly large and 
influential.  This can bias econometric results as measurement error is usually an important 
problem when low poverty incidence observations are present in the data.4 Additionally, 
                                                           
1
 He empirically finds evidence for unconditional as well as conditional convergence, i.e. without and with 
control variables, with conditional convergence being quantitatively more rapid.   
2
 The poverty and income dataset is obtained from survey data available at povcal.net. It has a median interval 
between surveys of 13 years. About three quarters of household surveys use consumption instead of income data, 
as is common in the literature. See Ravallion (2012) for more details. 
3
 For empirical evidence that the income share of lower-income deciles does not systematically vary among 
countries with different growth rates, see Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Dollar et al. (2016). 
4
 Even rounding issues introduce substantial measurement error at low levels of poverty incidence.  For example, 
if poverty incidence fell from 4.4 to 1.6%, this is a decline of 64%. If rounded to 4 and 2% it is a decline of 50%.  
Similar rounding errors are much smaller at higher levels of poverty incidence. When using percentage point 
 policymakers are usually interested in percentage point, not percentage changes of the 
poverty rate. As a result, Klasen and Misselhorn (2008) suggest to use a growth semi-
elasticity of poverty reduction instead, based on the specification  
 ∆ =   + ∆ ln  + .     (3) 
The difference in results between specifications linking growth and poverty reduction is 
depicted in Figures 1 and 2, with an R squared of 37.7% and 51.5% for the elasticity and 
semi-elasticity, respectively. If we assume poverty dynamics given by equation (3) within the 
conceptual framework of Ravallion (2012), we obtain the poverty convergence equation 
 ∆ =  
∗ + 
∗ , + 
∗ ,   (4) 
instead of Ravallion’s (2012) log-specification in equation (1). Also note that β* < 0 in 
equation (4) is sufficient for poverty to converge, as countries with higher initial poverty rates 
would see faster percentage point reductions of poverty rates. Ravallion’s equation (1) 
demands a much stronger concept of convergence, as it requires that a country should be more 
likely to reduce poverty from 60 to 30% than from, say, 4 to 2%, as both would imply a 50 
percent reduction of the poverty rate. 
Figure 1: Poverty elasticity of growth 
 
 
Figure 2: Poverty semi-elasticity of growth 
 
Estimating equation (4) making use of the data in Ravallion (2012) reveals highly significant 
convergence dynamics in poverty headcount rates, as illustrated in column 2 of Table 1 (as a 
comparison, column 1 in Table 1 shows the results of the original specification in Ravallion, 
2012). This finding is robust to alternative measures of poverty such as the poverty gap and 
even for the headcount ratio at the lower $1.25/day line, where the problem of initially low 
and imprecisely measured poverty rates is more severe.5   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
changes, such rounding errors introduce the same bias at all levels of poverty. 
5
 Table A.1 in the appendix shows that these results are also robust to the inclusion of the control variables 
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 Table 1: Main results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ∆ln(H$2) ∆(H$2) ∆(H$1.25) ∆(PG$2) 
Note: Ravallion Semi-elasticity Semi-elasticity Semi-elasticity 
  Headcount $2 Headcount $1.25 Poverty gap 2$ 
Log initial poverty 0.00590    
ln(Hi,t-1) (0.0100)    
Initial poverty  -0.0163*** -0.0268*** -0.0295*** 
Hi,t-1  (0.00368) (0.00474) (0.00459) 
Constant -0.0400 0.384* 0.366* 0.298** 
 (0.0409) (0.206) (0.215) (0.138) 
     
Observations 89 89 89 89 
R-squared 0.008 0.112 0.206 0.261 
Notes: The ‘initial poverty’ measure in columns (2)-(4) is the respective initial level corresponding to the dependent variable (i.e. the initial 
headcount at $2/day, at $1.25/day, and the initial poverty gap at $2/day, respectively). OLS results, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Figure 1 further highlights that practically all of the most severe outliers for the growth 
elasticity of poverty reduction regression are Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition 
economies.6 For these countries Ravallion (2012: 509) states that their experience “is clearly 
not typical of the developing world.” As shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 and in 
Figure 3 (dashed line), dropping these observations or accounting for their special dynamics 
with a dummy variable is sufficient to obtain statistically significant poverty convergence 
even in the demanding log-specification (1) used by Ravallion (2012).7 This result is robust to 
alternative measures of poverty (poverty gap at $2/day and the headcount ratio at $1.25/day) 
and to the inclusion of control variables proposed by Ravallion (2012).8 
A detailed analysis of this finding poses more challenging data requirements and is beyond 
the scope of this note, whose focus is to show that poverty convergence only requires the 
specification of a growth semi-elasticity of poverty reduction and that under this specification 
poverty convergence is indeed present in the developing world. Our results, however, 
highlight several aspects that need to be taken into account when addressing global poverty 
dynamics.  First, CEE transition economies had historically low poverty rates, so even small 
percentage point changes will be reflected in relatively high percent changes in the log 
specification and get a very high leverage in the corresponding least-squares regression. 
Figure 3 reflects this, as low poverty is the exception among developing countries, so the CEE 
observations are far off the sample mean. This might also explain the many outliers in Figure 
1 and might point to measurement error in the case of economies with low poverty incidence. 
                                                           
6
 The 11 Central and Eastern European countries in the sample, with their corresponding time spans, are Poland 
(1996-2005), Ukraine (1996-2005), Belarus (2000-2005), Latvia (1998-2004), Romania (1998-2005), Russia 
(1993-2005), Albania (1996/97-2005), Estonia (1995-2004), Lithuania (1996-2004), Moldavia (1997-2004), and 
Macedonia (1998-2003). 
7
 In particular, it is sufficient to take out the observations of Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Latvia, which are the 
most outlying points, to obtain poverty convergence at the 5 percent level of statistical significance. Excluding 
Romania and Russia in addition leads to poverty convergence at the 1 percent significance level (results not 
reported but available on request). Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that there are no significantly different 
convergence dynamics within the CEE group, as indicated by a statistically insignificant CEE-specific 
convergence parameter (results not reported but available on request).  
8
 See Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
 9
 Second, the fact that we do not have to control for the particular dynamics of poverty in CEE 
countries in our alternative specification in order to obtain evidence of convergence reflects 
the fact that the semi-elasticity approach proposed by Klasen and Misselhorn (2008) is less 
susceptible to (sometimes arbitrary or poorly measured) developments at the very left tail of 
the income distribution. Third, however, there seem to be CEE-specific dynamics that cannot 
be fully explained by the analytical implications of the growth elasticity of poverty reduction 
as derived by Bourguignon (2003). Accordingly, the CEE dummy variable stays statistically 
significant in our specification of (absolute) poverty convergence (column (3) of Table 2),10 
without changing the overall results much (see Figure 4). Fourth, the two most promising 
channels to explain the specific CEE dynamics appear to be cyclical reversion effects for the 
mean income growth rate11 and unique distributional effects that influence the growth 
elasticity of poverty reduction.12  
 
Table 2: Transition economies’ results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ∆ln(H$2) ∆ln(H$2) ∆(H$2) 
 Elasticity Elasticity Semi-elasticity 
 Headcount $2 Headcount $2 Headcount $2 
 w/o CEE w/ CEE dummy w/ CEE dummy 
Log initial poverty -0.0228*** -0.0220***  
ln(Hi,t-1) (0.00463) (0.00631)  
Initial poverty   -0.0208*** 
Hi,t-1   (0.00413) 
CEE dummy  -0.178*** -1.049*** 
  (0.0421) (0.266) 
Constant 0.0803*** 0.0771*** 0.731*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0249) (0.267) 
    
Observations 78 89 89 
R-squared 0.230 0.420 0.148 
Notes: OLS results, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                           
9
 The mean initial poverty headcount in the CEE subsample is 5.6%, compared to 30.6% in the overall sample of 
Ravallion (2012). 
10
 It seems also worth noticing in this context that dropping the 5 or 10 percent of Ravallion’s (2012) sample that 
had the lowest initial poverty incidence, as is usual in many empirical assessments of the growth elasticity, does 
not lead to observing poverty convergence in the sense of equation (1). 
11
 Prior to the sample period, CEE transition economies suffered severe shocks to their output level. Most 
neoclassical convergence models suggest that such countries, which are far off their steady state, should see 
higher subsequent growth (‘cyclical reversion’). Indeed, CEE countries saw significantly higher mean income 
growth rates than implied by a simple mean income convergence regression (results are available upon request). 
12
 Inequality levels increased substantially during the initial output collapse in transition economies, with a 
positive relationship between the size of the output collapse and the increase in inequality (see Ivashenko, 2003; 
Grün and Klasen, 2001). In subsequent years (which are those included in the sample) there was some decline of 
inequality in countries like Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, moderating the massive inequality shock experienced 
earlier. As a result, the unconditional poverty elasticity of growth was larger in those countries, due to this 
decline in inequality, confirmed in Figure 1. 
 Figure 3: Log poverty convergence 
 
Figure 4: Absolute poverty convergence 
 
 
Do our findings imply that the argument in Ravallion (2012) about the adverse effect of high 
initial poverty on growth and on poverty reduction through growth in mean income are 
mistaken? On the one hand, despite finding robust poverty convergence, we still confirm the 
finding in Ravallion (2012) that countries with higher initial poverty see lower mean income 
growth rates13 and experience a lower growth elasticity of poverty reduction after controlling 
for CEE-specific poverty dynamics (see columns (1)-(3) of appendix Table A.3). On the other 
hand, this is purely driven by the log specification of the dependent variable, as the growth 
semi-elasticity of poverty reduction is no longer dependent on the interaction with the initial 
poverty level, which is far from being statistically significant in either levels or logs.14 This 
suggests that there is not necessarily a relevant economic effect of initial poverty slowing 
down subsequent poverty reduction but that it is by definition more difficult to obtain higher 
percent reductions in poverty rates at higher initial poverty levels, as shown by Bourguignon 
(2003).  
However, either specification suggests that poverty reduction strategies that are based 
exclusively on growth will only see very limited and slow effects on poverty reduction in 
countries where poverty is the most pressing problem. In the log specification, the significant 
interaction term implies that the positive effect between growth and poverty reduction 
practically vanishes for the majority of developing countries which face high initial poverty 
rates (see Figure 5 in the Appendix). In the semi-elasticity specification, this results from the 
implied economic magnitudes: based on Table 1, column (2), assuming a country with a 
poverty headcount index (at $2 a day) of 41.1 percent (which is the mean at the final period of 
the sample) would imply an annual poverty reduction of 0.29 percentage points, which is 
rather low and implies that reaching the international target of eliminating poverty by 2030 is 
unlikely.  Of course, higher growth can make a difference.  Based on column (6) in appendix 
Table A.3, moving from the average sample mean income growth rate of 1.3 % p.a. to the 
75th percentile of 3.5 % p.a. would increase the annual percentage point reduction of poverty 
                                                           
13
 The negative effect of initial log poverty decreases from -0.02 (significant at the 1% level, Ravallion, 2012: 
Table 2, model 1) to -0.01 (significant at the 10% level) when including the CEE dummy. It is also significant (at 
the 10 % level) when it enters as the absolute headcount index (instead of logs). Results are available on request. 
14
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overall sample of Ravallion  withouth CEE
 from 0.31 to 0.88 percentage points—still certainly too low for most developing countries to 
reduce poverty fast enough.15 Clearly, higher poverty reduction can only be achieved if 
inequality is also reduced which, as shown by Bourguignon (2003) and Klasen and 
Misselhorn (2008), not only reduces poverty directly, but also increases the elasticity (and 
semi-elasticity) of growth to poverty reduction and might even, following Deininger and 
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 Similar quantitative impacts apply to the $1.25 poverty line, which is the measure that was originally targeted. 
 Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Robustness of semi-elasticity specification to control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ∆(H$2) ∆(H$1.25) ∆(PG$2) 
Note: Semi-elasticity Semi-elasticity Semi-elasticity 
 Headcount $2 Headcount $1.25 Poverty gap 2$ 
    
Initial poverty -0.0330*** -0.0396*** -0.0427*** 
Hi,t-1 (0.00660) (0.00496) (0.00493) 
Log primary  -0.409 0.132 0.0686 
schooling (0.410) (0.309) (0.227) 
Log life expectancy -4.178** -3.618** -2.493** 
 (1.793) (1.416) (1.043) 
Log relative price of 0.477** 0.574** 0.440** 
investment goods (0.199) (0.227) (0.169) 
Constant 18.03** 12.49** 8.603* 
 (7.881) (5.951) (4.355) 
    
Observations 88 88 88 
R-squared 0.371 0.451 0.497 
Notes: The table is equivalent to columns (2)-(4) of table 1 but includes the control variables proposed by Ravallion (2012). 
OLS results, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A.2: Robustness of log poverty convergence specification with CEE dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ∆ln(H$2) ∆ln(H$1.25) ∆ln(PG$2) 
Note: $2 a day 
(headcount) 
$1.25 a day 
(headcount) 
Poverty gap 
($2 a day) 
    
Log initial poverty -0.0312*** -0.0211* -0.0247*** 
ln(Hi,t-1) (0.00960) (0.0112) (0.00516) 
CEE dummy -0.173*** -0.184*** -0.184*** 
 (0.0440) (0.0671) (0.0392) 
Log primary schooling -0.0280   
 (0.0171)   
Log life expectancy -0.0734   
 (0.0613)   
Log relative price of 0.0107   
investment goods (0.0109)   
Constant 0.488* 0.0484 0.0577*** 
 (0.293) (0.0411) (0.0181) 
    
Observations 88 82 89 
R-squared 0.486 0.188 0.361 
Notes: The ‘log initial poverty’ measure is the respective initial level corresponding to the dependent variable (i.e. the initial log headcount at 
$2/day, at $1.25/day, and the log initial poverty gap at $2/day, respectively). OLS results, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in 




Table A.3: Effects of initial poverty on the poverty (semi-)elasticity of growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












       
Log(initial poverty) -0.00529 -0.0137*** -0.0130***  -0.24049  
 (0.00498) (0.00417) (0.00432)  (0.18309)  
Initial poverty    -0.00942  -0.0112** 
    (0.00679)  (0.00430) 
Mean income growth -2.587*** -2.103*** -2.905*** -34.96*** -18.20 -25.59*** 
 (0.366) (0.342) (0.690) (9.747) (14.94) (7.423) 
Initial poverty × 0.0281*** 0.0222***  0.136   
Mean income growth (0.00479) (0.00450)  (0.210)   
Log(initial poverty) ×   0.563***  -2.448  
Mean income growth   (0.170)  (5.635)  
CEE dummy  -0.0694** -0.0673 0.853* 0.1637  
  (0.0347) (0.0408) (0.492) (0.374)  
Constant 0.00869 0.0445*** 0.0443*** 0.302 0.773 0.483*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.192) (0.470) (0.156) 
       
Observations 89 89 89 89 89 89 
R-squared 0.680 0.721 0.675 0.585 0.573 0.566 
Notes: Poverty is measured as the $2/day headcount ratio. Column (1) reproduces Ravallion (2012: Table 4, specification 1). Column (2) 
uses the same specification with the CEE dummy. Column (3) estimates the same model in a full log-specification, with the results used to 
obtain the parameters in Figure 6. Columns (4)-(6) show these estimates for absolute poverty levels and changes. As the CEE dummy in 
column (4) is only significant when the (insignificant) interaction term is included, we drop both in specification (6). OLS results, 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 5: Growth elasticity of poverty reduction by initial poverty level 
 
Note: Figure 6 displays the implied effect through the interaction between log initial poverty and mean income 
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